Na alle doemverhalen van onze groene vrienden over nakende catastrofes (zoals voedsel-, water en energieschaarste, opwarming van de aarde, verzuring van de oceanen, afnemende biodiversiteit, zeespiegelstijging, verspreiding van enge ziekten, uitstervende ijsberen, ontbossing, woestijnvorming en zo meer) is het altijd weer een verademing om kennis te nemen van nuchtere, goed gefundeerde toekomstprojecties vanuit het bedrijfsleven. Dat geldt in het bijzonder voor de recente presentatie van de 'BP Energy Outlook 2030' door de chief economist van BP, Christof Rühl.
De belangrijkste conclusie is dat we ons ook op de wat langere termijn niet ongerust hoeven te maken over de beschikbaarheid van betaalbare energie. Dat is natuurlijk slecht nieuws voor de professionele onheilsprofeten, die hierdoor in hun negotie worden bedreigd. Maar het is goed nieuws voor de gemiddelde burger.
Onder de titel, 'Availability of affordable energy no obstacle to long-term growth' schreef Christof Rühl in de 'European Energy Review':
Some of the results of BP's annual Energy Outlook 2030, a forecast of long term energy developments published on January 18th, will sound familiar: Global energy demand is set to keep rising, driven by the industrialization and urbanisation of middle and low income countries; global energy consumption 20 years hence will still be based on fossil fuels; the world will demand more, not less, oil from the Middle East. Others may be more surprising: North America will become self-sufficient in energy; transport fuels globally will remain petroleum based; and despite rapid growth of renewables and the progressive decarbonisation of key sectors, such as power, this looks like a world where carbon emission continue to grow.
With the very notable exception of greenhouse gas emissions, these projections add up- not in the conventional sense of demand matching supply (that too), but in the peculiar sense that energy (and its price) will not become an obstacle to long term economic growth. A combination of efficiency gains and fuel supply growth ensures, in particular, that the industrial transformation of non-OECD economies will continue at pace.
For these projections to be useful, one needs to unlock the story they convey. In energy, two powerful trends encapsulate this story: First, energy intensity converges across countries, at accelerating speed and to lower and lower levels. Energy intensity (the amount of energy needed to produce one unit of GDP) is often seen as the broadest possible measure of energy efficiency. Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, it has differed widely across countries and regions; but since the 1980s, we see massive and accelerating convergence across countries: never since the industrial revolution has global energy intensity been as lowas today; and never have differences across countries been so small.
The second trend is the equalisation of fuel shares. As fuel demand grows, fuel shares converge. By 2030, fossil fuels (oil gas and coal) will have about 27% global market share each, non-fossil fuels (nuclear, hydropower, renewables) will converge to about 7% each: for the first time since the industrial revolution, there will be no single dominant fuel in 2030 - as coal and then oil used to be.
These two trends help our outlook (and other projections like it) to "add-up" the way they do. Consider, for example, the question whether continued growth in China may threaten global economic progress, by undermining the availability of affordable resources. We project India and China to account for two thirds of global demand growth to 2030. But this incorporates decelerating Chinese energy consumption growth as the economy matures, the share of its industrial sector recedes and the efficiency of industrial production itself increases. India will not become "another China" any time soon, because its pattern of industrialisation differs. ...
Our two trends thus incorporate benevolent developments. It pays to ask where these come from. Energy intensity converges around the world because, for lack of a better word, of globalisation: No comparable innovation is expected to come from the vast energy areas under state control - not in production, and not in consumption international competition adjusts national production structures; energy trade and the diffusion of technologies spreads efficiency gains into fuel production, intermittent use, and final consumption; and a peculiar by-product of globalisation, the standardisation of consumption baskets around the world (including such items as housing, heating and transport) re-enforces the process.
The convergence of fuel shares, though of a somewhat less general nature, is driven by the same forces. The share of natural gas increases because of new supplies, including unconventional production and the rapid growth of LNG; coal loses out to newly available alternatives (gas, nuclear and renewables), and oil's share declines because it is replaced outside the transport sector - where oil remains indispensible and where its potential for efficiency gains remains large. In a nutshell, the reasons for North America to become self-sufficient encapsulate the main forces at work: supplies are rising because the most open and competitive upstream market in the world has unlocked new resources by generating new production technologies (unconventional gas, offshore oil, oil sands); regulation and high prices are promoting biofuels and fuel efficiency.
These developments are market driven, and supported by regulation able to harness market forces.
Maar met de CO2-uitstoot zal het minder goed gaan volgens Rühl. Gelukkig weten mijn trouwe lezers dat dit geen probleem vormt, omdat de AGW-hypothese (AGW = Anthropogenic Global Warming) overtuigend is weerlegd. Maar BP houdt daar kennelijk nog politiek correct aan vast.
Eindelijk dus goed nieuws? Zullen we daar dan ook in de toekomst de vruchten van plukken? Ik heb zo mijn twijfels. Onderschat nooit de destructieve invloed van het energiebeleid van overheden, die hun oren laten hangen naar de milieubeweging.